OnCo
ideasIdea

Limit secondary patents and pay-for-delay so cancer generics arrive on time

Companies extend monopolies on cancer drugs with dozens of minor patents and deals that pay generic makers to stay out. Closing these loopholes would bring cheaper versions years earlier.

Analyses of imatinib, lenalidomide and other oncology blockbusters show effective exclusivity extended by years through secondary patents on salts, formulations and dosing and through settlements delaying generic entry. India's Section 3(d) restricts secondary patents; the EU and US have sanctioned some pay-for-delay deals. The proposal is a coordinated set of reforms: a higher inventive-step bar for secondary pharmaceutical patents, presumptive illegality of reverse-payment settlements, and a public database of patent expiry dates per oncology product so generic entry can be planned.

Hypothesis
Reforms reduce the gap between compound patent expiry and first generic entry for oncology drugs from a median of several years to under one year, and reduce spend on affected drugs by more than half within two years of entry.
Rationale
Generic entry produces the largest price fall available in pharmaceuticals (often over 80%) and delays to entry are among the most expensive policy failures per dollar; the legal tools exist and have been shown to work in some jurisdictions.
What would test it
Quantify effective exclusivity extension for the 30 highest-spend oncology drugs across five jurisdictions, then track generic entry timing following reform in one jurisdiction.
Maturity
early clinical
Who has to act
policy
Cost to try
Small (under $1M)
Years to first evidence
5
Bottlenecks it attacks

Connected

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