OnCo
ideasIdea

A legal right to obtain marketed cancer drugs at cost for combination trials

If a company refuses to supply its approved drug for a well-designed independent trial combining it with a rival's drug, the law would let the trial buy it at manufacturing cost, with results shared back.

A research-access provision, analogous to compulsory licensing but for trial supply: an independent scientific committee can certify an academic or non-profit combination trial as in the public interest, after which the patent holder must supply the drug at a regulated cost-of-goods price or license a generic maker to do so, in exchange for full access to the trial's data and a right to use results in labelling. The provision only bites when voluntary agreement fails and so mostly changes bargaining positions. It addresses the documented pattern of companies declining to supply comparators or partners for trials that might disadvantage their product.

Hypothesis
Introducing a certified research-access right increases the number of cross-company combination and head-to-head academic trials started per year by at least half in the jurisdiction, with the right actually invoked in fewer than one in five cases because voluntary supply improves.
Rationale
Research exemptions in patent law exist in most jurisdictions but do not cover supply; the mere existence of compulsory licensing has repeatedly lowered prices in negotiations without being used. Trials such as STAMPEDE and the RT-IO platforms have been delayed or reshaped by supply refusals.
What would test it
Enact in one jurisdiction with a five-year sunset and track combination and comparative trial starts, supply refusals reported to the committee, and invocations.
Maturity
speculative
Who has to act
policy
Cost to try
Small (under $1M)
Years to first evidence
3
Bottlenecks it attacks

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