OnCo
ideasIdea

A guaranteed purchase prize for the first drug against a named hard target

Governments promised in advance to buy vaccines that did not yet exist, and they got made. The same promise could be made for a drug against a target everyone has given up on.

Advance market commitments worked for pneumococcal vaccines and shaped COVID-19 vaccine supply. Applied to undruggable oncology targets, a public or philanthropic funder would commit to purchase a defined volume at a defined price for the first agent meeting a pre-specified efficacy bar against a designated target such as KRAS G12D in pancreatic cancer or gain-of-function mutant p53, with access conditions attached.

Hypothesis
A committed purchase guarantee of sufficient size measurably increases the number of active industrial programmes against the designated target within three years of announcement.
Rationale
Investment in high-risk targets is limited by uncertain revenue rather than by scientific interest; demand-side instruments change that calculation without picking a technical approach.
What would test it
Announce one pilot commitment with a clear technical specification and independent adjudication, and count programme starts, patent filings and consortium formation against matched control targets over three years.
Maturity
speculative
Who has to act
policy
Cost to try
Large (over $50M)
Years to first evidence
8
Bottlenecks it attacks

Connected

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